Credit Rating Agencies

Standard & Poor’s Settles Inflated Ratings Case for $1.5 Billion

Published on: February 3, 2015 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

Credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s will pay $1.5 billion to settle a number of lawsuits accusing the company of inflating the ratings of mortgage securities in the lead up to the 2008 economic crisis. As part of the deal, S & P’s parent company McGraw Hill will pay $687.5 million to the U.S. Justice Department and $687.5 million to the District Columbia and 19 states over their inflated ratings cases.

The U.S. sued the credit rater in 2013, asking for $5 billion and claiming that S & P had bilked investors. The company fought the claims, arguing that the First Amendment protected its ratings and contending that the mortgage ratings case was the government’s way of retaliating after S & P downgraded the United States’ own credit rating. As part of the settlement, the credit rating agency said it found no evidence that retaliation was a factor.

S & P is not admitting to violating any law. It noted that its mission is to give the marketplace information that is independent and objective and employees are not allowed to influence analyst opinions because of commercial relationships.

DOJ Gets Ready to Wrap Mortgage Bond Case Against Standard & Poor’s, Probes Moody’s

Published on: January 31, 2015 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

According to the Wall Street Journal, the U.S. Department of Justice has been meeting with ex-Moody’s Investor Service (MCO) executives to talk about the way the credit ratings agency rated complex securities prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Sources say that the probe is still in its early stages and it is not certain at the moment whether the government will end up filing a bond case against the credit rater.

DOJ officials are trying to find out whether the company compromised its standards in order to garner business. The government’s focus is on residential mortgage deals that took place between 2004 and 2007.

Moody’s and credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s gave triple A ratings to the deals so that even conservative investors were buying the subprime loan-backed securities. The investments later proved high risk. When the housing market failed, the bond losses cost investors billions of dollars.

Standard & Poor’s to Pay Almost $80 Million to Resolve SEC Charges Over Ratings Fraud Involving CMBSs

Published on: January 21, 2015 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

Standard & Poor’s has agreed to settle U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission charges accusing the credit rating agency of fraudulent misconduct when rating certain commercial mortgage-backed securities. As part of the settlement, S & P will pay close to $80 million—$58 million to resolve the regulator’s case, plus $12 million to settle a parallel case by the New York Attorney General’s Office, and $7 million to resolve the Massachusetts Attorney General’s case.

The SEC put out three orders to institute resolved administrative proceedings against the credit rater. One order dealt with S & P’s practices involving conduit fusion SMBS ratings methodology. The Commission said that the credit rating agency’s public disclosures misrepresented that it was employing one approach when a different one was applied to rate several conduit fusion CMBS transactions, as well for putting out preliminary ratings on two transactions. To resolve these claims S & P will not rate conduit fusion CMBSs for a year.

The SEC’s second order said that after S & P was frozen out of the market for its conduit fusion ratings in 2011, the credit rating agency published a misleading and false article claiming to show that it’s overhauled credit ratings criteria enhancement levels could handle economic stress equal to “Great Depression-era levels.” The Commission said that S & P’s research was flawed, were made based on inappropriate assumptions, and the data used was decades off from the Depression’s serious losses. Without denying or admitting to the findings, S & P has consented to publicly retract the misleading and false data about the Depression era-related study and rectify inaccurate descriptions that were published about its criteria.

Standard & Poor’s on the Verge of Civil Settlement Over Real-Estate Bond Ratings, Reports WSJ

Published on: December 29, 2014 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

According to The Wall Street Journal, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services is close to arriving at a securities settlement with regulators over the way they graded real-estate bonds. The agreement would resolve claims by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley, and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.

The proposed deal is over six commercial real estate bond ratings issued by the credit rater in 2011. In July of that year, S & P withdrew a preliminary rating on a $1.5 billion security comprised of commercial real-estate loans. The decision made debt issuers and investors very angry. (The deal was later partially overhauled and eventually went to market.)

S & P discovered discrepancies in the way its ratings methodology applied for commercial real estate deals. However, it said the incongruence was not outside what is considered an acceptable range. Still, investigators were compelled to look at the withdrawn rating and other deals from that period.

Moody’s Reduces American Realty Capital Properties Credit Rating to Junk Status, REIT’s Founder Nicholas Schorsch Steps Down

Published on: December 16, 2014 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

American Realty Capital Properties’ (ARCP) credit rating was just downgraded to junk status by Moody’s Investors Service (MCO). The credit rater is now rating the real estate investment trust with a Ba1, which is just under investment grade. Moody’s has also given ARCP a negative outlook. The downgrade comes following this week’s management shakeup at the REIT and its disclosure several weeks ago of massive accounting irregularities that were covered up.

This week, American Reality Capital Properties’ chairman and founder Nicholas Schorsch stepped down, as did COO Lisa Beeson and chief executive David Kay. In October, ARCP’s chief accounting officer and CFO also resigned after an $23 million accounting mistake was announced.

The change in management comes weeks after the REIT disclosed that it misstated financial results in 2014’s first quarter and purposely concealed the error by misrepresenting second quarter results. After the REIT revealed the $23 million accounting error, a number of firms suspended trading in nontraded real estate investment trusts that were run and backed by companies under Schorsch. The firms included Fidelity, Charles Schwab (SCHW), Pershing, LPL Financial (LPLA), AIG Advisor Group, National Planning Holding, Securities America, and even Schorsch’s Cetera Financial Group broker-dealer network.

SEC Subjects Credit Rating Agencies, Asset-Backed Securities Issuers to Tighter Rules

Published on: August 28, 2014 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

The SEC has approved rules granting the agency more control over credit rating agencies and obligates asset-backed securities issuers to reveal additional information about underlying loans. S.E.C. Chairwoman Mary Jo White says that the reforms will give investors crucial protections while making the securities market stronger.

The rules target the activities, products, and practices that were key factors in the 2008 financial crisis. They would apply to more than $600 billion of the asset-backed securities market, over which the SEC presides. The rules, however, won’t apply to bonds guaranteed by Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FMCC). Both entities are exempt from SEC rules.)Also, the new disclosure requirements won’t apply to private placements that are only sold to sophisticated investors.

Leading up to the economic crisis, Wall Street had packaged mortgages into investments that were given high ratings even though they didn’t necessary contain the highest quality subprime loans. Investors sustained huge losses when the securities plunged in value.

OppenheimerFunds Increases Its Exposure to Puerto Rico Debt Despite Downgrade by Moody’s, S & P, and Fitch to Junk Status

Published on: February 14, 2014 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

Even though Puerto Rico’s debt has been downgraded to “junk” status by the three major ratings agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings), OppenheimerFunds (OPY) has increased its holding of Puerto Rican debt in two of its municipal bond funds that carry lower risk. The credit raters downgraded the US Commonwealth over worries about its failing economy and decreased ability to finance its deficits in capital markets.

According to Reuters, Lipper Inc. says that at the end of last year, the Oppenheimer Rochester Short-Term Municipal Fund’s (ORSCX) exposure to Puerto Rico’s debt had risen 13% from a year ago, while its Intermediate-Term Municipal Fund more than doubled its exposure to 17%. (Details of the holdings in both funds since then are still unavailable.) Both have a 5% limit on how much junk-rated debt they can contain. However, because the US territory’s debt was downgraded after the buys were made, Oppenheimer, which is part of MassMutual Financial Group, may not obligated to unload the assets.

The company has continued to support Puerto Rico municipal bonds, even as a lot of other mutual fund firms have lowered their exposure to Puerto Rico debt. This week, Oppenheimer downplayed the investment risk involved, noting that most bonds involved are insured (Reuters reports that 27% of the holdings in the intermediate-fund and another 4% in the short-term fund, do not have insurance).

How Can you Recover Your Loss on UBS Puerto Rico Municipal Bonds?

Published on: February 7, 2014 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

Previous articles have described the numerous problems that many investors currently face as a result of investments their broker at UBS or another brokerage firm made to invest in Puerto Rican municipal bonds. Other posts have discussed why UBS knew or should have known that those problems were imminent, and yet kept selling those bonds to virtually all of its clients. Those problems have even gotten worse, as Moody’s has followed suit from Standard & Poor’s and downgraded approximately $55 billion worth of Puerto Rico’s outstanding bonds, pushing many of those into junk bond status. The question becomes, now what? What options do investors have?

Broker-dealers, like UBS and UBS Puerto Rico, are regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). FINRA rules give customers of broker-dealers the option of filing complaints against their broker and his employing company in arbitration. Arbitration is a court alternative. It can be quicker and less expensive than a claim filed in a state or federal court; FINRA arbitration cases typically take between 12 to 18 months from when they are filed to when a decision is rendered by the arbitrators.

The proceedings are also much less invasive for the customer bringing the claim. Typically, customers are not required to respond to written questions under oath, submit to depositions, or in person questioning on the record, or other similar discovery procedures which occur in court litigation. Instead, the customers are generally only required to produce certain paper documents in their possession; things like statements from their broker, letters and/or emails between themselves and their broker, certain tax records, etc. The only other requirement is to attend a final, in person hearing, similar to a trial in court, where the customer will have the opportunity to explain their story before the arbitrators.

Standard and Poor’s Reduces Puerto Rico Obligation Debt to Junk Status

Published on: February 6, 2014 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

This week, Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) cut the credit rating for Puerto Rico’s general obligation debt to junk-bond status due to concerns about an inability to access capital markets. S&P had put the US territory’s rating on notice for such a downgrade late last year. Now, the credit rating agency announced, it is officially issuing that downgrade to a “BB”-a level under investment grade.

The credit rating agency believes that the Caribbean island’s ability to sell additional debt in $3.7 trillion municipal bond market is limited and cash shortages could happen. Because of such “liquidity constraints,” S & P does not feel that an investment-grade rating is warranted. The agency also cut its rating on Puerto Rico’s Government Development Bank to a BB, as well.

Puerto Rico has been in peril of getting a ratings downgrade by all three US credit raters for some time now in part because of its $70 billion of tax-free debt. Responding to the junk status downgrade, Puerto Rico’s Treasury Secretary and Government Development Bank said that S & P’s decision was a disappointment but they remained “confident” that the US territory had enough liquidity to meet such needs through the fiscal year’s conclusion.

Claims Mount: UBS Loss Larger Than Reported in Puerto Rico

Published on: February 5, 2014 | by Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas, LLP

The losses that investors in Puerto Rico bonds and UBS Puerto Rico bond funds have suffered continue to mount, and the downgrade to high risk, or “junk bond” status is only going to make things worse. In 2013 alone, investors in Puerto Rican bonds saw losses of over 20%. However, those losses do not include the leverage that many investors were ultimately exposed to. Many investors were sold proprietary investments funds created by UBS. Those funds borrowed additional funds to be able to purchase even larger amounts of Puerto Rican bonds. This strategy increases the potential gains an investor can make, but also increases the potential losses. Investors in funds that were 50% leveraged, which many UBS funds were, saw losses closer to 40%.

This permitted these UBS funds to see losses of over $1.6 billion. Moreover, these losses do not take into account the losses of investors who were convinced to buy Puerto Rico bonds outside of these funds, or investors who lost additional money through extra leverage sold by their brokers.

Many investors were convinced to borrow more money, either through a margin account, a bank loan, or through a second mortgage, to make even larger investments, exponentially increasing their risk. These layers of borrowed money made it possible for some investors to see their entire accounts get wiped out.