Articles Posted in Financial Firms

A jury has ordered Wells Fargo to pay four Minnesota nonprofits $30 million in securities fraud damages. The Minnesota Medical Foundation, the Minneapolis Foundation, the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Reinsurance Association, and the Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Foundation for Children had accused the investment bank of investing their funds in high risk securities and then failing to disclose until it was too late that the investments were going down in value. The same jury has yet to decide the issue of punitive damages
The jury found that Wells Fargo violated the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act and breached its fiduciary duty to the nonprofits. In the investment program that the Minnesota nonprofits participated in, Wells Fargo would hold its clients’ securities in custodial accounts and use the money to issue temporary loans to brokerage firms for their trading activities. Each brokerage firm posted collateral of at least 102% the worth of the borrowed securities’ value.

While the investment bank had promised that the nonprofits money would be placed in liquid, safe investments, the plaintiffs contend that Wells Fargo put their money in high-risk securities, including asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities. They say that even as the collateral investments’ value became less stable in 2007, the investment bank continued to place more of the nonprofits’ securities out on loan. The nonprofits also claim that when two of the SIV’s went into receivership and they asked Wells Fargo to either redeem their interests or return the securities, the investment bank refused to do so until the collateral investments were sold and the nonprofits made up a shortfall in value.

While the nonprofits are asking for over $400 million in damages, Wells Fargo’s lawyers argue that the actual damages to the plaintiffs was just $14.3 million. According to the bank, “the investments made by Wells Fargo on behalf of our clients in the securities lending program were in accordance with investment guidelines and were prudent and suitable at the time of purchase.” Apparently ignoring the claim or puntive damages, the investment bank says it is pleased that the plaintiffs were denied the full amount of damages they had sought. Wells Fargo continues to maintain that it didn’t invest in high-risk securities and that the nonprofits had the choice to get out of the investments if they were willing to pay 102% of the collateral.

Related Web Resources:
Wells Fargo ordered to pay $30 million for fraud, MRNewsQ, June 3, 2010
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According to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Citigroup Global Markets Inc. has consented to pay $1.5 million in disgorgement and fines for failing to properly supervise broker Mark Singer and his handling of trust funds belonging to two cemeteries. By agreeing to settle, Citigroup is not denying or admitting to the charges. Also, the disgorgement amount of $750,000 will be given back to the cemetery trusts as partial restitution.

FINRA says that from September 2004 and October 2006, Singer and his clients Craig Bush and Clayton Smith were engaged in securities fraud. Their scheme involved misappropriating some $60 million from cemetery trust funds. Bush and Smart were the successive owners of the group of cemeteries in Michigan that the funds are believed to have been stolen from. Smart bought the cemeteries from Bush in August 2004 using trust funds that were improperly transferred from the cemeteries to a company that Smart owned.

When Singer went to work for Citigroup as a branch manager in September 2004, he brought Bush’s cemetery trust accounts with him. FINRA says that Singer then helped Smart and Bush open a number of Citigroup accounts in their names and in the names of corporate entities that the two men controlled or owned. The broker also helped them deposit cemetery trust funds into some of the accounts, as well as effect improper transfers to third parties. Some of the fund transfers were disguised as fictitious investments made for the cemeteries.

FINRA says that Citigroup failed to properly supervise Singer when it did not respond to “red flags” and that this lack of action allowed the investment scheme to continue until October 2006. As early as September 2004, Singer’s previous employer warned Citigroup of irregular fund movements involving the Michigan cemetery trusts. Within a few months, Citigroup management also noticed the unusual activity.

Citigroup failed to “conduct an adequate inquiry” even after finding out in February 2005 that Smart may have been making misrepresentations about his acquisition of hedge fund investments that belonged to the Michigan cemetery trusts and had used the hedge funds as collateral for a $24 million credit line. Although the investment bank had received a whistleblower letter in May 2006 accusing Singer of broker misconduct related to his handling of the cemetery trusts, it still failed to restrict Singer’s activities or more strictly supervise him.

Related Web Resources:
Citi Sanctioned $1.5M By Finra In Supervisory Lapse, The Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2010
Stealing from the dead, CNN Money, August 13, 2007 Continue Reading ›

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority says that Deutsche Bank Securities and National Financial Services LLC have consented to be fined $925,000 in total for supervisory violations, as well as Regulation SHO short sale restrictions violations. By agreeing to settle, the broker-dealers are not denying or admitting to the charges.

FINRA claims that the two investment firms used Direct Market Access order sytems to facilitate client execution of short sales and that they violated the Reg SHO “locate” requirement, which the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted in 2004 to discourage “naked” short selling. FINRA says that while the two broker-dealers put into effect DMA trading systems that were supposed to block short sale order executions unless a locate was documented, the two investment banks submitted short sale orders that lacked evidence of these locates.

FINRA says that during the occasional outages in Deutsche Bank’s systems, short sale orders were automatically rejected even though a valid documented locate had been obtained. This is when the the investment bank would disable the automatic block in its system, which allowed client short sales to automatically go through without first confirming that there were associated locates.

As for NFS, FINRA contends that the investment bank set up a separate locate request and approval process for 12 prime clients that preferred to get locates in multiple securities prior to the start of trading day. With this separate system, the requests and approvals for the numerous locates did not have to be submitted through the firm’s stock loan system at approval time. Instead, the clients could enter and execute orders through automated platforms that lacked the capacity to automatically block short sale order executions that didn’t have proper, documented locates.

Related Web Resources:
FINRA Fines Deutsche Bank Securities, National Financial Services a Total of $925,000 for Systemic Short Sale Violations, FINRA, May 13, 2010
Regulation SHO, Nasdaq Trader Continue Reading ›

In a May 10 Securities and Exchange Commission filing, JP Morgan Chase & Co. says that an SEC regional office intends to recommend that the agency file charges against the investment bank for securities violations involving the selling or bidding of derivatives and guaranteed investment contracts (GICs). JP Morgan says the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and a group of state attorneys general are looking into the allegations. The investment bank is cooperating with investigators.

JP Morgan’s Form 10-Q details the bank’s activities during the first quarter of 2010. The investment bank says that Bear Stearns is also under investigation for possible securities and antirust violations involving the sale or bidding of GICs and derivatives. JP Morgan acquired Bear Stearns in 2008.

Guaranteed Investment Contract
GICs are sold by insurance companies. Other names for GIC include stable value fund, capital-preservation fund, fixed-income fund, and guaranteed fund. GICs are considered safe investments with a value that remains stable. They usually pay interest from one to five years and when a GIC term ends, it can be renewed at current interest rates.

Related Web Resources:
US Securities and Exchange Commission

Guaranteed Investment Contracts, Financial Web Continue Reading ›

RBC Capital Markets Corp., Equity Station Inc., Fagenson & Co. Inc., Olympic Securities LLC, and Alpine Securities Corp. have consented to pay $385,000 to settle Financial Industry Regulatory Authority that they sold collectively over 7.5 billion in “unregistered” penny stock in Universal Express Inc. shares and made about $8.4 million as a result. By settling, the broker-dealers are not agreeing to or denying the securities fraud accusations.

FINRA says that “in each instance” the investment firm’s clients deposited certificates that consisted of huge blocks of thinly traded securities and then liquidated the positions right away. The firms conducted the sales even after a 2004 Securities and Exchange Commission complaint accused Universal Express of illegally issuing over 500 M shares in unregistered stock to be distributed to the public. The SEC claimed the company’s leaders put out bogus press releases and false and misleading statements to promote the sale of the unregistered stock.

According to FINRA:

• RBC Capital Markets reported making $68,000 in commissions from the unregistered stock sale. The broker-dealer has consented to a $135,000 fine.

• Equity Station made $13,575 in commissions. The investment firm is fined $25,000.

• Fagenson & Co. has agreed to a $165,000 fine and made $44,000 in commissions.

• Olympic Securities is fined $20,000 after making $5,200 in commissions.

• Alpine Securities is fined $40,000 for earning $13,575 in commissions.

FINRA says that even with numerous red flags, all five firms did not take the necessary actions to find out whether selling the securities would violate violating federal registration requirements. FINRA contends that when the five broker-dealers conducted the majority of the illegal unregistered stock sales the SEC had either began or won its case against Universal Express, which was eventually sanctioned almost $22 million.

Related Web Resources:
FINRA Fines Five Firms $385,000 for Sale of Unregistered Securities, Other Violations Relating to Penny Stocks, FINRA, April 27, 2010
Regulatory Notice 09-05, FINRA
SEC wins case against Universal Express, CEO, Business Journal, March 2, 2007 Continue Reading ›

It was announced by Reuters News today that regulators at the New York Stock Exchange have fined Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing Corp. $450,000 in connection with roughly 385 orders to “short” equity securities for clients that resulted in “fail-to-deliver” positions without first borrowing or arranging to borrow the securities as collateral. The nearly 400 infractions occurred in a seven-week period in December 2008 – January 2009.

So that timely delivery of the shares sold can be made to buyers, a rule has existed for decades that says investors cannot sell securities short unless arrangements have been made to borrow such securities. Stock shares can be made available to lend by anyone who owns those shares. For example, when margin agreements are signed at a brokerage firm by investors, the agreement contains language which allows their securities to be rented to those seeking to sell the shares short, (The rent charged is almost always kept by the firm.) This can happen at the same brokerage firm or arrangements can be made by one firm to lend available securities to another firm to transact short sales for itself or its clients.

There have been many examples of “short squeezes”, some undoubtedly intentional, in which shares are either not available to meet borrowing demand, or shares previously lent are reclaimed. This caused short sellers to have to scramble to find shares or be “bought in” on the open market. In some situations in the past, the law of supply and demand for shares has caused the price of the stock to rise to two or three times its pre-squeeze price, wiping out the short sellers. Thus, rampant short selling had its own unique deterrent.

It is up to the brokerage community to police the borrowing rule. Through computers, availability of shares can be very easily learned before a short sale is executed. In the “heydays” of day trading firms during the 1990s, day traders would seek to “block up” shares in advance of a short sale to avoid the delay of locating shares when the desired price was reached. (There were some tricks used to try to accomplish this while not telegraphing to professional traders and specialists that short sales were imminent, but we will not attempt a full explanation of these at this time.)

As part of the deregulation which occurred prior to the market crash of 2008-2009, while short sale regulations remained in place, the hard rule of making certain that shares are available at the time the short sale is executed was modified to allow firms to simply act in “good faith” to attempt to locate the shares. As wild flections were occurring in the stock markets during the crash, professional traders often reaped huge profits on short sales. The “good faith” crack in the door for those selling short grew to an open door policy of simply not enforcing this and other short sale rules. While the term “naked shorts” became a part of the culture, this was nevertheless simply deregulation by non-enforcement of the borrowing rule.

There has been no information revealed as to whether the Goldman Sachs’ admission of some 400 borrowing rule violations over a 7 week period is indicative of thousands of such violations by Wall Street during the years regulators were looking the other way. However I – for one – would not be shocked to learn that this is a mere “drop in the bucket” of the total borrowing violations which actually occurred. If Goldman Sachs claims it is being singled out on this one, that is likely the truth. However, I quickly learned as a teenager that the defense of “everyone else is doing it” was not going to work with my regulators.
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Stifel Financial Corp. is reporting an 80% increase of earnings during its first quarter, which ended on March 31, compared to last year. Nearly 57% of its operating profit and 64% of revenue came from its global wealth management group. The profit increase came even as the financial firm slowed down its recruitment of new brokers. On its financial adviser roster, just 45 names were added, as Stifel made the decision not to engage in recruitment wars with larger firms that have enhanced their recruiting packages in an effort to bring in new people who can help the firms rehabilitate their reputations in the wake of the 2008 market collapse. Bank of America’s Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, and other investment banks are reportedly offering leading brokers up to 300% of the revenue they produced in the last 12 months.

While Stifel increased its adviser roster by over 500 in 2009, absorbing over 300 advisers from UBS Financial Services Inc.’s wealth management group and 56 retail branches, this year the financial firm seems to be focusing more energy on creating a more balanced revenue mix. By merging (a $300 M deal), with Thomas Weisel Partners Group Inc. Stifel’s retail and investment-banking/capital revenue will be brought into balance.

According to Investment News, Ron Kruszewski, Stifel chief executive and chairman, as saying that the ex-UBS brokers that are now working for Stifel are working at about 80% of their potential. Seeing as many of them started with the financial firm toward the end of last year, it may take a little longer for them to fully transfer their client assets and achieve complete operational efficiency.

Related Web Resources:
Stifel backs off recruiting wars — and profits soar, Investment News, April 29, 2010
Stifel Financial Corp. Announces First Quarter Results, Marketwatch, April 29, 2010 Continue Reading ›

Although the Senate hearing over Goldman Sachs, & Co.’s role in structuring a collateralized loan obligation that caused investors to lose about $1 billion in losses has ended, the case against the investment bank is far from over. The SEC’s securities fraud lawsuit filed earlier this month makes numerous disturbing allegations against Goldman Sachs, and now lawmakers are calling on the Justice Department to begin a criminal probe into the CDO transaction that is a focus of the SEC case.

The SEC says Goldman Sachs and one of its vice presidents defrauded investors by structuring and marketing a synthetic collateralized debt obligation that was dependent on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), while at the same time failing to tell investors about certain key information, such as the role that a major hedge fund played in portfolio selection or that the hedge fund had taken a short position against the CDO.

The hedge fund, Paulson & Co, is one of the largest in the world. The SEC says that Paulson & Co. paid Goldman to allow it to set up a transaction that let it take these short positions. The SEC contends that Goldman acted wrongfully when it let a client that was betting against the mortgage market heavily influence which securities should be part of an investment portfolio, while at the same time telling other investors that ACA Management LLCS (ACA), an objective, independent third party was choosing the securities. Investors, therefore, did not know about Paulson & Co’s role in choosing the RMBS or that the hedge fund would benefit if the RMBS defaulted.

SEC alleges that Paulson & Co. shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped choose by taking part in credit default swaps (CDS) with Goldman Sachs to purchase protection on specific layers of the ABACUS capital structure. Because of its financial short interest, Paulson & Co had reason to choose RMBS that it thought would undergo credit events in the near future. In the term sheet offering memorandum, flip book, or marketing materials that it gave investors, Goldman did not reveal Paulson & Co’s short position or the part the hedge fund played in the collateral selection process.

The SEC is also accusing Goldman Sachs Vice President Fabrice Tourre of being principally responsible for ABACUS. He structured the transaction, prepared the marketing materials, and dealt directly with investors. The SEC claims that Tourre knew about Paulson & Co’s role and misled ACA into thinking that the hedge fund invested about $200 million in the equity of ABACUS, while indicating that Paulson & Co’s interests in the collateralized selection process were closely in line with ACA’s interests.

Six months after the deal closed on April 26, 2007 and Paulson & Co had paid Goldman Sachs about $15 million for structuring and marketing Abacus, 83% of the RMBS in the ABACUS portfolio was downgraded and 17% was on negative watch. By Jan 29, 2008, 99% of the portfolio had been downgraded.

“Synthetic derivative investments are so highly complex that even highly sophisticated investors can be defrauded,” says Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas LTD LLP Founder and Stockbroker Fraud Attorney William Shepherd. ” Any other investor being sold these is simply “fair game” for Wall Street. Our securities fraud law firm represents five school districts that lost over $200 million in what they were told were very low-risk investments into bonds. Not only were these not “bonds” but the risk to them was enormous.”

Goldman CEO says has board’s support: report, Reuters, April 27, 2010
Blankfein Says He Was ‘Humbled’ By Senate Hearing, NPR, April 29, 2010
What’s Next for Goldman Sachs?, New York Times, April 29, 2010
SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud in Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages, SEC.gov, April 16, 2010
Read the SEC Complaint (PDF)
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UBS AG will pay $217 million to settle an accounting fraud lawsuit filed by HealthSouth Corp. bondholders and shareholders. Under the settlements, bondholders will receive $100 million and shareholders will get $117 million. UBS is HealthSouth’s investment bank. Meantime, Ernst & Young LLP, the. health-care services provider’s accounting firm, had settled with shareholders for $109 million and will now settle with bondholders for $33.5 million.

The settlements are a result of litigation filed over a $2.7 billion fraud at HealthSouth. The accounting scheme occurred between 1996 and 2002. After the fraud was discovered in March 2003, nearly $6 billion in market value was lost when the company’s share price dropped. 15 executives pleaded guilty over their involvement in the scam.

By agreeing to settle, UBS & Earnst & Young are not admitting to or denying wrongdoing. UBS maintains that HealthSouth lied to UBS bankers numerous times. In 2008, UBS consented to pay $100 million to HealthSouth over claims the investment bank failed to discover the fraud.

Shareholders also settled the accounting fraud with HealthSouth in 2006 for $355 million and received another $20 million from UBS in an Alabama court case. Meantime, bondholders received $90 million in their settlement with HealthSouth and $5 million from UBS in state court case. Bondholders and shareholders will also receive compensation from a $2.88 billion judgment against Richard Scrushy. HealthSouth’s founder was acquitted of criminal charges related to the fraud but in 2006 was convicted over a different bribery case.

Related Web Resources:
UBS to Pay $217 Million to Settle HealthSouth Case, BusinessWeek, April 23, 2010
UBS, Ernst Settle HealthSouth Cases for $250.5 Million, ABC News, April 24, 2010 Continue Reading ›

Our stockbroker fraud law firm is happy to announce that a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority panel has awarded one of our clients her entire principal loss of $604,094 for her securities fraud claim related to the Schwab California Tax-Free Yield Plus Fund. The award is not part of Schwab’s $200 million class action settlement.

Like Schwab’s Yield Plus fund, SWYCX was marketed as an ultra short-term bond fund and an alterative to money market holdings or cash. In fact, not only were the securities illiquid, hard to value, untested, thinly traded, and highly vulnerable to market changes, but the fund was exposed to variable-rate bonds that were pegged to the London Interbank Offering Rate.

Phone conversations recorded by Schwab with our client confirm the investor’s desire for safety of principal for her assets. During such exchanges, Schwab represented SWYCX as a better investment to Treasuries and Money Market and told the client that instead of holding such a large position in money market or cash for an extended time period it was better to place “cash” investments in the Yield Plus fund. Our securities fraud lawyers have other Schwab clients that were offered similar representations.

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