Articles Posted in FINRA

FINRA says that Citigroup Inc. subsidiary Citi International Financial Services LLC must pay over $1.2M in restitution, fines, and interest over alleged excessive markdowns and markups on agency and corporate bond transactions and supervisory violations. The financial firm must also pay $648,000 in restitution and interest to over 3,600 clients for the alleged violations. By settling, Citi International is not denying or admitting to the allegations.

According to FINRA, considering the state of the markets at the time, the expense of making the transactions happen, and the value of services that were provided, from July ’07 through September ’10 Citi International made clients pay too much (up to over 10%) on agency/corporate bond markups and markdowns. (Brokerages usually make clients that buy a bond pay a premium above the price that they themselves paid to obtain the bond. This is called a “markup.”) Also, from April ’09 until June ’10, the SRO contends that Citi International did not put into practice reasonable due diligence in the sale or purchase of corporate bonds so that customers could pay the most favorable price possible.

The SRO says that during the time periods noted, the financial firm’s supervisory system for fixed income transactions had certain deficiencies related to a number of factors, including the evaluation of markups/markdowns under 5% and a pricing grid formulated on the bonds’ par value rather than their actual value. Citi International will now also have to modify its supervisory procedures over these matters.

In the wake of its order against Citi International, FINRA Market Regulation Executive Vice-President Thomas Gira noted that the SRO is determined to make sure that clients who sell and buy securities are given fair prices. He said that the prices that Citi International charged were not within the standards that were appropriate for fair pricing in debt transactions.

If you believe that you were the victim of securities misconduct or fraud, please contact our stockbroker fraud law firm right away. We represent both institutional and individual investors that have sustained losses because of inadequate supervision, misrepresentations and omissions, overconcentration, unsuitability, failure to execute trades, churning, breach of contract, breach of promise, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, margin account abuse, unauthorized trading, registration violations and other types of adviser/broker misconduct.

Before deciding to work with a brokerage firm that is registered with FINRA, you can always check to see if they have a disciplinary record by using FINRA’s BrokerCheck. Last year, 14.2 million reviews of the records of financial firms and brokers were conducted on BrokerCheck.

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Bank of America’s Merrill Lynch Settles for $315 million Class Action Lawsuit Over Mortgage-Backed Securities, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, December 6, 2011

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AXA Advisors LLC will pay a $100,000 fine to settle Financial Industry Regulatory Authority allegations that it delayed too long before firing a broker who was also the mastermind of a Ponzi scam. The financial firm turned in a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent prior to there having to be a regulatory hearing, without denying or admitting to the findings, and without an adjudication of any issue. AXA Advisors is a subsidiary of AXA Financial, Inc., which is an AXA Group member.

Kenneth Neely, a former registered representative, started working with AXA in its Clayton, Missouri office in August 2007. FINRA contends that already by then, Neely had been the subject of four client complaints. Three of these were securities arbitrations over business practices he employed with previous employees. (Prior to working at AXA, he was registered with Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. and UBS PaineWebber, Inc.) The SRO believes that AXA also knew that Neely was having financial problems at the time.

Neely was permanently barred by FINRA in 2009 for running the Ponzi scam, which bilked its victims of $600,000. Many of the investors he defrauded belonged to his church. According to the SRO, Neely to conceal his financial scheme by having investors pay $2K to $3K to his wife. He also created fake invoices to make them appear as if they were actual ownership certificates. He did pay investors about $300,000. A lot of his investors’ money went toward supporting his extravagant lifestyle. Neely eventually pleaded guilty to the federal crime of mail fraud. He was sentenced to 37 months in months in prison and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $618,270.

Per the AWC, Neely started running a Ponzi scam in 2001 while he was still working at UBS. He continued his fraud operation while at Stifel and when he went to go work with AXA. He persuaded AXA clients, Stifel customers, and others to take part in the St. Louis Investment Club, which was a fake club and put their money in the St. Charles REIT, which was a bogus real estate investment trust. After he admitted to converting and commingling funds. AXA fired him in July 2009.

However, it was as early as 2008, when AXA conducted its yearly audit of Neely, that a review of his computer brought up an Excel spreadsheet noting eight people’s payment schedules. Per the AWC, these people were investors in Neely’s fraud. An AXA examiner asked Neely to explain the spreadsheet and the broker claimed that the figures were for showing a potential client/friend, who wanted to start a business, how to handle his finances. The AWC alleges that this explanation was a false one.

FINRA found that AXA failed to properly supervise or investigate Neely by not responding appropriately to the spreadsheet, his excuses, or the fact that he had a questionable history. AXA has now been both sanctioned and fined.

AXA Fined $100,000 For Not Axing Ponzi Broker Sooner, Forbes, March 15, 2012

Ex-AXA Broker Barred by Finra After Ponzi Scheme, New York Times, July 28, 2009


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Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. and AXA Advisors Broker Charged in Ponzi Scheme Victimizing Church Members, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, November 5, 2009
AXA Rosenberg Entities Settle Securities Fraud Charges Over Computer Error Concealment for Over $240M, February 10, 2011 Continue Reading ›

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Inc. is thinking of giving up its proprietary lock on BrokerCheck information. This would allow for greater examination of a broker’s disciplinary data, including regulatory and arbitration actions, as well as customer complaints. The SRO is currently seeking public comment on this matter through April 6.

Opening up access to BrokerCheck data would allow commercial users to make the reports, known for being pretty dense, friendlier for users. (Some people have said that the information available is “convoluted” and uses language that can be hard for an investor to comprehend.) This could help investors more easily find information about a broker. Also, vendors might be able to establish comparison data and some complaint data on the firm-level could become accessible.

Up until this point, FINRA has been protective about keeping its disciplinary information confidential. Not only has it prevented the automatic downloading of the BrokerCheck database, but also, this information has only been available through one-off data requests by individuals.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Inc. is thinking of giving up its proprietary lock on BrokerCheck information. This would allow for greater examination of a broker’s disciplinary data, including regulatory and arbitration actions, as well as customer complaints. The SRO is currently seeking public comment on this matter through April 6.

Opening up access to BrokerCheck data would allow commercial users to make the reports, known for being pretty dense, friendlier for users. (Some people have said that the information available is “convoluted” and uses language that can be hard for an investor to comprehend.) This could help investors more easily find information about a broker. Also, vendors might be able to establish comparison data and some complaint data on the firm-level could become accessible.

Up until this point, FINRA has been protective about keeping its disciplinary information confidential. Not only has it prevented the automatic downloading of the BrokerCheck database, but also, this information has only been available through one-off data requests by individuals.

Critics of FINRA’s closed door policy have said these limitations protect the financial industry by keeping embarrassing information about firms and brokers private. While this has allowed financial advisers with numerous complaints against them to keep such secrets quiet, invaluable information, such as whether one broker has received more complaints than another, ends up not becoming known. The SRO, however, maintains that it hasn’t been shielding the industry with its BrokerCheck restrictions.

One reason that FINRA is considering making its BrokerCheck data more easily accessible is because it has been under pressure to merge the database’s search results with the Investment Adviser Public Disclosure database. IAPD data is pubic information and can be downloaded automatically. (Last year, FINRA considered putting the two systems together into one database to be made public but now says it is more practical to keep them separate.)

It wasn’t until recently that FINRA was the only regulator to have an online tool that let investors look into the backgrounds of members of the financial services industry. It was in 2010 that the Securities and Exchange Commission widened the IAPD database to include not just investment advisor firm information, but also data about IA representatives.

Last year, as mandated by Dodd-Frank’s Section 919B, the Commission put out a study and recommendations on how to better investor access to information related to broker-dealer and investment adviser registration. AdvisorOne reports that to improve how investors can better access this type of data, the SEC is recommending that search findings for it and the IAPD databases be unified, zip code and other location indicator-related searches be implemented, and educational content to help investors navigate any unfamiliar term definitions or links be included. Dodd-Frank wants these recommendations implemented soon, and FINRA plans to have this completed by the July deadline.

FINRA to Restructure BrokerCheck, Giving Investors More Power, AdvisorOne, March 2, 2012

Finra may give up lock on BrokerCheck, InvestmentNews, March 1, 2012

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Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Ordered to Pay $1M FINRA Fine for Not Arbitrating Employee Disputes Over Retention Bonuses, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, January 6, 2012 Continue Reading ›

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit says that the Securities and Exchange Commission did not abuse its discretion when it determined that broker Scott Mathis “willfully” withheld information from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority about tax liens. Mathis had submitted a petition seeking for the court to review the SEC order. However, the court, denying the request, found that there was “substantial evidence” backing up the SEC’s findings that he did, in fact, hold back information in a willful manner.

Between 1985 and 2002, Mathis was a principal or broker at numerous financial firms. He had submitted three Form U-4 registrations with FINRA. It was after 1996 that the IRS put in five tax liens against him. The federal agency accused him of not paying his personal income taxes over a several-year period. Mathis is accused of not noting the liens in filings with FINRA even though he is purported to have known about them.

According to the court, in 2003 FINRA asked Mathis to explain why he didn’t reveal the liens. He told the SRO he wasn’t aware that they existed or that he had an obligation to note them down on his Form U-4. FINRA then began proceedings against the broker, ultimately holding that he acted “willfully” in failing to report the tax liens. He was suspended for three months and fined $10,000.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority has filed a complaint against Charles Schwab Corp. The SRO says the online brokerage is in violation of FINRA rules because it makes clients waive their rights to pursue class actions against it.

Per a new provision added to over 6.8 million customer account agreements, Charles Schwab clients are now not allowed to begin or join class-action complaints against the financial firm. Customers must also agree that arbitrators won’t be given authority to consolidate claims from different parties, as this would set up a class-action situation.

Over 50,000 clients have opened accounts with the financial firm since it implemented this new limitation. Now, FINRA wants an expedited hearing. The SRO is concerned that the class action waiver will cause millions of Schwab clients to mistakenly think they cannot bring or take part in an already existing class action complaint against the brokerage firm. Also, FINRA has specific rules about the conditions that financial firms can place on clients, and the SRO says this provision is a definite violation.

In an effort to help incoming National Football League members from getting their careers started on solid financial ground, the NFL and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Investor Education Foundation are working with each other to help educate players and their families about investment fraud. The joint efforts come in the wake of professional players finding themselves the target of financial scams.

At events held during the East/West Shrine Game in Florida last month, the NFL and FINRA Foundation planed to reach participants through video presentation and other resources regarding:

• Selecting the right financial professionals • Checking these represenatives’ backgrounds • Becoming educated about debt.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority has put out a formal notice to stockbrokers to let them know that complex financial products must come under the focus of heightened supervision. According to the SRO, a complex product is one with numerous features that can impact its investment returns depending on different scenarios-especially if the average retail investor can’t be expected to easily comprehend what these features are and how they can lead to an investment return.

Examples of complex products:

• Investments linked to the way the markets perform, such as certain exchange-traded products that can expose investors to the volatility of the stock market and products that create leveraged or inverse exposure.

FINRA says that Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith must pay a $1M fine because it didn’t arbitrate employee disputes about retention bonuses. Registered representatives that took part in the bonus plan had signed promissory notes stating that should such disagreements arise, they would go to New York state court and not through arbitration to resolve them. FINRA says this agreement violated its rules, which requires that financial firms and associated individuals go through arbitration if the disagreement is a result of the business activities of the associated person or the firm.

It was after merging with Bank of America that Merrill Lynch set up a bonus plan to keep high-producing registered reps. The financial firm gave over 5,000 registered representatives $2.8B in retention bonuses that were structured as loans in 2009. By agreeing that they would go to state court, the representatives were greatly hindering their ability to make counterclaims. FINRA also says that because Merrill Lynch designed the bonus program so that it would seem as if the money for it came from MLIFI, which is a non-registered affiliate, the financial firm was able to go after recovery amounts on MLIFI’s behalf in court, which allowed Merrill Lynch to circumvent the arbitration requirement. After a number of registered representatives did leave the financial firm without paying back the amounts due on the promissory notes in 2009, Merrill Lynch filed more than 90 actions in state court to collect these payments.

Since September 14, 2009, FINRA has been expediting cases involving claims made by brokerage firm over associated persons accused of not paying money owed on a promissory note. Such disputes are supposed to be resolved through arbitration.

The SRO has also been known to get involved in other types of financial firm-employee disputes. For example, in another recent FINRA proceeding, an arbitration panel ordered Citigroup to pay a former investment advisor team and their administrator $24M for not fairly compensating them for transactions involving an institutional client that they brought with them when they moved from Banc of America Securities. Robert Vincent Minchello, his brother James Bryan Minchello, and Martha Jane Sullivan claimed that Citigroup only partially compensated them for a few of the transactions before cutting them out of that business relationship.

Merrill fined $1 mln for failure to arbitrate, Reuters, January 25, 2012

SEC Approves Rule Establishing Expedited Procedures for Arbitrating Promissory Note Cases, FINRA, September 14, 2009


More Blog Posts:

Securities Claims Accusing Merrill Lynch of Concealing Its Auction-Rate Securities Practices Are Dismissed by Appeals Court, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, November 30, 2011

Merrill Lynch Faces $1M FINRA Fine Over Texas Ponzi Scam by Former Registered Representative, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, October 10, 2011

Bank of America’s Merrill Lynch Settles for $315 million Class Action Lawsuit Over Mortgage-Backed Securities, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, December 6, 2011

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Last month, a US judge refused Citigroup‘s request to overturn a $54.1M arbitration award that a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitration panel had ordered the financial firm to pay investors Gerald D. Hosier, Jerry Murdock Jr. and Brush Creek Capital. The award was the largest amount ever granted to individuals in a securities arbitration proceeding.

Following Citigroup’s request that a United States district court toss out the award, details from what were confidential proceedings have been unsealed. According to the New York Times, documents viewed by the arbitrators show that on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 signifying the highest risk (usually only assigned to products that potentially carried the risk of an investor losing everything), Citigroup rated these investments as having a 5 rating for risk. Is it no wonder then that investors could and would go on to lose 80% of what they had investments.

The investments, which were municipal arbitrage portfolios, are known as ASTA/MAT. Citigroup Global Markets sold them through MAT Finance LLC.

Per internal e-mails, after the investments began declining in value in early 2008, when Citigroup wealth management head Sallie Krawcheck asked for the MAT’s risk rating,” She was told that it was “3-5.” Also, customers were never told about the 5 rating that their investments were previously given. The Times also reported that during a conference call involving brokers whose clients had sustained losses, the portfolio manager was directed to not discuss internal guidelines, which contained different information than what was in the prospectus that investors had received.

Citigroup eventually would offer to buy back the investments at a discount price but only if investors agreed to not file a securities fraud lawsuit against the financial firm. (Brokers have said they felt pressured by Citigroup to get investors on board with this. For example, a memo with the heading “Fund Rescue Options “noted that if the broker’s client let Citigroup repurchase the instruments, this would not be noted in his/her U-5 regulatory record. If, however, the client chose to sue, then this would appear in the broker’s U-5.)

In their securities fraud case, Claimants accused Citigroup of failure to supervise, fraud, and unsuitability. After the FINRA arbitration panel ordered them to pay the investors, Citigroup argued that panel members had ignored the law and contended that despite verbal statements made to investors, the latter had signed agreements acknowledging that the risk of losing everything was a possibility. Judge Christine Arguello would go on to affirm the FINRA panel’s decision. While the majority of the award was compensation for the claimants’ investment losses, about $17 million was for punitive damages.

Secrets of a Sales Machine, NY Times, January 14, 2012
Citigroup Slammed With $54 Million Award by FINRA Arbitrators in MAT/ASTA Case, Forbes, April 12, 2011

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Citigroup Request to Overturn $54.1M Municipal Bond Arbitration Ruling Denied by Judge, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, December 27, 2011
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Citigroup Global Markets Inc. Sues Two Saudi Investors in an Attempt to Block Their FINRA Arbitration Claim Over $383M in Losses, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, October 22, 2012 Continue Reading ›

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