Articles Posted in FINRA

A Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitration panel has ordered Oppenheimer & Co. to repurchase the $5.98 million in New Jersey Turnpike ARS that it sold Nicole Davi Perry in 2007. The investor reportedly purchased the securities through Oppenheimer Holdings Inc. (OPY).

Perry, who, along with her father, filed her ARS arbitration claim against the financial firm in 2010, accused Oppenheimer of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. She and her father, Ronald Davi, were reportedly looking for liquidity and safety, but instead ended up placing their funds in the auction-rate securities. They contend that they weren’t given an accurate picture of the risks involved or provided with a thorough explanation of the securities’ true nature.

Oppenheimer disagrees with the panel’s ruling. In addition to buying back Perry’s ARS, the financial firm has to cover her approximately $134,000 in legal fees.

It was just in 2010 that Oppenheimer settled the ARS securities cases filed against it by the states of New York and Massachusetts. The brokerage firm consented to buy back millions of dollars in bonds from customers who found their investments frozen after the ARS market collapsed and they had no way of being able to access their funds.

Oppenheimer is one of a number of brokerage firms that had to repurchase ARS from investors. These financial firms are accused of misrepresenting the risks involved and inaccurately claiming that the securities were “cash-like.” A number of these brokerage firms’ executives allegedly continued to allow investors to buy the bonds even though they already knew that the market stood on the brink of collapse and they were selling off their own ARS.

ARS
Auction rate securities are usually corporate bonds, municipal bonds, and preferred stock with long-term maturities. Investors receive interest rates or dividend yields that are reset at each successive auction.

ARS auctions take place at regular intervals—either every 7 days, 14 days, 28 days, or 5 days. The bidder turns in the lowest dividend yield or interest rate he or she is willing to go to purchase and hold the bond during the next auction interval. If the bidder wins at the auction, she/he must buy the bond at par value.

Failed auctions can happen when there are not enough bidding buyers available to acquire the entire ARS block being offered. A failed auction can prevent ARS holders from selling their securities in the auction.

There are many reasons why an auction might fail and why there is risk involved for investors. It is important that investors are notified of these risks before they buy into the securities and that they only they get into ARS if this type of investment is suitable for their financial goals and the realities of their finances.

Oppenheimer settles with Massachusetts, NY, Boston, February 24, 2010

More Blog Posts:
Oppenheimer Funds Investors Can Proceed with Their Securities Fraud Lawsuit, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, November 19, 2011

Raymond James Settles Auction-Rate Securities Case with Indiana Securities Division for $31M, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, August 27, 2011

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A US judge has denied Citigroup’s request that the $54.1M Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitration award issued to investors that sustained losses in municipal bond funds be overturned. This is one of the largest securities arbitration awards that a broker-dealer has been ordered to pay individual investors. Brush Creek Capital, retired lawyer Gerald D. Hosier, and investor Jerry Murdock Jr. are the award’s recipients. However, these Claimants are not the only investors to come forward contending that they were told the funds were suitable for investors that wanted to preserve their capital.

The investor losses were related to several leveraged municipal bond arbitrage funds that saw their value significantly drop between 2007 and 2008. Citigroup Global Markets had sold the municipal bond funds through MAT Finance LLC. Proceeds were invested in longer-term muni bunds while borrowing took place at low, short-term rates. The strategy proved to be unsuccessful, resulting in investors losing up to 80% of their money.

According to The Wall Street Journal, when it issued its ruling the arbitration panel appeared to reject three defenses that financial firms usually make:

• The financial crisis, and not the financial firm, is to blame for the losses.
• Sophisticated, rich investors should have known what risks were involved.
• The prospectus had warned in advance that investors could lose everything.

The Claimants alleged fraud, failure to supervise, and unsuitability. They had sought no less than $48 million in compensatory damages, fees, lost-opportunity costs, commission, lawyers’ fees, and interest.

The FINRA arbitration panel awarded $21.6 million in compensatory damages, plus 8% per annum, to Hosier, $3.9 million in compensatory damages, plus 8% per annum, to Murdock, Jr, and $8.4 million in compensatory damages, plus 8% per annum, to Brush Creek Capital LLC.

All Claimants were also awarded $3 million in lawyers’ fees, $17 million in punitive damages, $33,500 in expert witness fees, $13,168 in court reporter expenses, and $600 for the Claimant’s filing fee.

Following the FINRA ruling, Citigroup contended that the arbitration panel had ignored the law when arriving at the award. The brokerage firm also claimed that investors could not have depended on verbal statements that the financial firm had expressed about purchases because the clients had acknowledged through signed agreements that they could lose everything they invested. By denying Citigroup’s request to throw out the arbitration award, Judge Christine Arguello, however, said that the court found Citigroup’s “argument wholly unpersuasive.”

A Crack in Wall Street’s Defenses, New York Times, April 24, 2011

Citigroup Slammed With $54 Million Award by FINRA Arbitrators in MAT / ASTA Case, Municipal Bond, April 12, 2011

Citigroup loses suit to overturn $54-million ruling, Reuters, December 22, 2011


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JPMorgan Chase to Pay $211M to Settle Charges It Rigged Municipal Bond Transaction Bidding Competitions, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, July 9, 2011

Citigroup Ordered by FINRA to Pay $54.1M to Two Investors Over Municipal Bond Fund Losses, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, April 13, 2011

Citigroup’s $285M Mortgage-Related CDO Settlement with Raises Concerns About SEC’s Enforcement Practices for Judge Rakoff, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, November 9, 2011

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To settle Financial Industry Regulatory Authority securities fraud allegations against one of its brokers, Wells Fargo Advisers will pay a $2M fine, as well as repay an unspecified amount to elderly clients that were defrauded. Over 21 senior investors were reportedly targeted by Alfred Chi Chen, who sold them reverse convertible notes even though the majority of them were retired and/or had never invested in this type of complex instrument. A number of investors were in their 80’s and 90’s.

FINRA says that Chen made over $1M in commissions even as the investors sustained losses. He also is accused of not giving discounts on Unit Investment Trust (UIT) transactions even when clients were eligible. As part of its settlement, Wells Fargo will pay restitution to those that should have but did not get the discounts and those that were sold unsuitable investments.

FINRA Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement Brad Bennett said that Wells Fargo did not review the reverse convertible transactions to make sure that they were suitable and that investors were harmed as a result. The SRO also determined that Wells Fargo did not give certain clients that were eligible breakpoint and rollover and exchange discounts when they bought UITs because the financial firm’s procedures and systems were not sufficient to properly monitor unsuitable reverse convertibles and ensure that clients got the discounts for which they were eligible. (Discounts should be offered on UIT sales when purchases go beyond certain thresholds or involve termination or redemption proceeds from another UIT during the initial offering period.)

By agreeing to settle, Wells Fargo is not admitting to or denying FINRA’s allegations.

The SRO has filed a separate complaint against Chen, who allegedly exposed clients to risks that were not in line with their investment profiles. As of June 2008, 172 of the accounts he worked with held reverse convertibles. 148 accounts had concentrations over the 50% of their total holdings. 46 accounts had concentrations of over 90%.

Reverse Convertibles
These interest-bearing notes involve repayment of principal connected to an underlying asset’s performance. The specific terms of reverse convertibles may vary. An investor risks loss if the underlying asset’s value drops under a certain maturity level or during the reverse convertible’s term.

It is important for many elderly investors that their investments not expose them to too much risk. For an elderly senior to lose his/her life savings because a financial firm or broker behaved irresponsibly, committed securities fraud, or made an avoidable mistake is unacceptable.

Wells to pay $2M to settle claims broker sold unsuitable investments to seniors, Investment News, December 15, 2011
Wells Fargo Fined by Finra Selling Structured Notes to Aged, Bloomberg, December 15, 2011

More Blog Posts:

Broker-Dealers are Making Reverse Convertible Sales That are Harming Investors, Says SEC, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, July 28, 2011
RBC Wealth Management Unit Ferris Baker Watts to Pay Investors Restitution Over Reverse Convertible Notes Allegations, Says FINRA, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, October 23, 2010
Wells Fargo Settles for $148M Municipal Bond Bid-Rigging Charges Against Wachovia Bank, Institutional Investors Securities Blog, December 8, 2011 Continue Reading ›

According to FINRA CEO and Chairman Richard G. Ketchum, the SRO may put out a second concept proposal about its stance regarding disclosure obligations related to a possible Securities and Exchange Commission rulemaking about formalizing a uniform fiduciary duty standard between broker-dealers and investment advisers. Currently, the 1940 Investment Advisers Act defines the investment advisers’ fiduciary obligation to their clients, while broker-dealers are upheld to suitability rules that will be superseded next August by two FINRA rules regarding broker-dealer suitability standards.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s Section 913, however, said that it is SEC’s responsibility to determine whether these current regulatory and legal standards s are still effective and if any regulatory shortcomings that exist need to be filled. In July 2010, the SEC asked stakeholders for feedback about this mandates. After receiving over 3,000 public comments, it issued a study recommending that there be a uniform fiduciary standard for both types of representatives when giving advice to retail clients. The SEC could put out its proposed rule by the end of this year.

FINRA is working with the Commission on this and plans to stay involved in the process. It was just last year that the SRO put out a concept proposal seeking public comment about the idea that broker-dealers should have to provide retail investors with certain disclosures at the start of a business relationship. These clients would be required to give a written statement detailing the kids of services and accounts they provide, any conflicts of interests, and limits on duties that they are entitled to expect. FINRA said that regardless of what a unified fiduciary standard would look like, retail investors would benefit from getting this disclosure document at the start and that such a mandate is an “outright necessity.

To settle FINRA accusations that it used misleading marketing materials when selling Wells Timberland REIT, Inc., Wells Investment Securities, Inc. has agreed to pay a $300,000 fine, as well as to an entry of the findings. However, it is not denying or admitting to the securities charges.

FINRA claims that as the wholesaler and dealer-manager of the non-traded Real Estate Investment Trust’s public offering, Wells approved, reviewed, and distributed 116 sales and marketing materials that included statements that were misleading, exaggerated, or unwarranted.The SRO contends that not only did most of the REIT’s sales literature and advertisements neglect to disclose the meaning of Wells Timberland’s non-REIT status, but also it implied that Wells Timberland qualified as an REIT during a time when it didn’t. (Although its initial offering prospectus reported that it planned to qualify as an REIT for the tax year finishing up at the end of 2006, it did not qualify until the one ending on December 31, 2009.) Also, FINRA believes that Wells Timberland’s communications about portfolio diversification, redemptions, and distributions included misleading statements and that the financial firm lacked supervisory procedures for making sure the proprietary data and sensitive customer information were properly protected with working encryption technology.

While non-traded REITs are usually illiquid for approximately 8 years or longer, certain tax ramifications can be avoided if specific IRS requirements are met. FINRA says that the Wells ads failed to ensure that investors clearly understood that an investment that is not yet an REIT couldn’t offer them those tax benefits.

Last month, FINRA put out an alert notifying investors about the risks of public non-traded REITs. Non-exchange traded real estate investment trusts are not traded on a national securities exchange. Early redemption is usually limited and fees related to their sale can be high, which can erode one’s overall return. Risks involved include:

• No guarantee on distributions, which can exceed operating cash flow.
• REIT status and distributions that come with tax consequences
• Illiquidity and valuation complexities
• Early redemption that is limited and likely costly
• Fees that can grow
• Unspecified properties
• Limited diversification
• Real Estate risk

FINRA wants investors considering non-traded REITs to:

• Watch out for sales literature or pitches giving you simple reasons for why you should invest.
• Find out how much the seller is getting in commissions and fees.
• Know how investing in this type of REIT will help you meet your goals.
• Carefully study the accompanying prospectus and its supplements.

Public Non-Traded REITs—Perform a Careful Review Before Investing, FINRA

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Morgan Stanley Faces $1M FINRA Fine for Excessive Markups and Markdowns on Corporate and Municipal Bond Transactions, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, September 17, 2011

Citigroup Global Markets Inc. Sues Two Saudi Investors in an Attempt to Block Their FINRA Arbitration Claim Over $383M in Losses, Stockbroker Fraud, October 22, 2011

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FINRA says that Chase Investment Services Corporation will pay back investors for losses sustained from the unsuitable recommendation made that they buy floating rate loan funds and unit investment trusts. In addition to paying back clients $1.9M, Chase must also pay a $1.7M fine.

According to FINRA, brokers with Chase recommended these financial instruments to clients even though the investments were not suitable for them—either because they had hardly any investment experience or only wanted to take conservative risks. The SRO also says that the Chase brokers had no reasonable grounds to think the financial products would be a right fit for these investors.

FINRA believes that Chase failed to properly train its brokers or give them guidance about the suitability of floating-rate loan funds and UITs, as well as the risks involved. For example, there were UITs that contained a significant portion of assets in closed-end funds with high-yield or junk bonds. Yet, despite the risks involved, brokers from Chase made about 260 recommendations that were not suitable for clients who had little (if any) investment experience or were averse to high-risk investments. These investors ended up losing about $1.4 million.

Also subject to substantial credit risk and illiquidity were the floating-rate loan funds. Despite the fact that concentrated positions in the fund were unsuitable for specific clients, FINRA says that Chase brokers still recommended these to clients who wanted low risk, very liquid investments or preferred to preserve principal. Because of these allegedly unsuitable recommendations, investors lost almost $500K.

FINRA says that WaMu, Investments Inc., also recommended that customers by floating-rate loan funds, even though these were not appropriate for the investors. The financial firm, which had merged with Chase in 2009, is also accused of not properly training or supervising its employees that sold the investments.

More About UITs
Unit investment trusts involve diversified securities baskets that may contain high-yield bonds. While junk bonds can make greater returns for investors than investment-grade bonds, they also come with a high degree of risk.

More About Floating-Rate Loan Funds
These mutual funds are invested in short-term bank loans for companies with a below investment grade crediting rating. What investors earn will fluctuate depending on what interest rates the banks happen to be charging on the loans.

In the wake of the allegations against Chase, FINRA Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement Brad Bennett said that it was key that financial firms provide the proper guidance and training to brokers about product sales while supervising sales practices.

JPMorgan unit fined $1.7M over investment sales, Bloomberg Business Week/AP, November 15, 2011

FINRA Orders Chase to Reimburse Customers $1.9 Million for Unsuitable Sales of UITs and Floating-Rate Loan Funds, FINRA, November 15, 2011

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Morgan Stanley Faces $1M FINRA Fine for Excessive Markups and Markdowns on Corporate and Municipal Bond Transactions, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, September 17, 2011

Wedbush Ordered By FINRA Panel To Pay $3.5M to Trader Over Withheld Compensation, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, July 16, 2011

Bank of America Merrill Lynch to Settle UIT Sales-Related FINRA Charges for $2.5 Million, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, August 22, 2010

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The Securities and Exchange Commission has filed an administrative complaint against the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority accusing one of the latter’s directors of changing three sets of staff meetings minutes that SEC officials had requested. These revisions made the documents, which were delivered in August 2008, incomplete and inaccurate. This could affect FINRA’s chances of becoming the SRO for investment advisers. Currently, FINRA serves that role for just broker-dealers.

It was FINRA that reported the document problem to the Commission and then worked with the agency to resolve the matter. The SRO then appointed new leadership in the Kansas office (the director has since resigned) where the tampering took place and implemented changes that improved procedures for document handling. Modifications included more live and online ethics training, as well as greater document integrity. Other undertakings FINRA has agreed to:

• Train workers about past document integrity problems • Create a podcast on document integrity to show current and prospective employees • Talk about the importance of document integrity at yearly regulatory meetings, townhall gatherings, and at Senior Management onsite visits at district offices • Mandate that senior Office of Liaison and Counsel meet with every business that is about to undergo an on-site exam before the documents are generated for the SEC

Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (C) is suing Abdullah and Ghazi Abbar. The Saudi investors have filed a FINRA arbitration claim against the Citigroup unit seeking to recover the $383 million that they say the bank lost their family’s money. The Abbars, who are father and son, are accusing Citigroup Global Markets of mismanaging their family’s savings.

Citigroup, which wants injunctive relief, says that the entities that took care of the the Abbars’ private-equity loan and leveraged option transactions are located abroad and therefore not under FINRA’s jurisdiction for arbitration. The financial firm also says that father, son, and their investment entities are not CGMI clients and their claims are not activities related it. The investment bank has noted that the Abbars chose to pursue it rather than the non-U.S. parties that they actually had agreements with that completed the transactions. The Abbars, however, say that those overseeing the Citigroup entities that took party in the daily management of their credit deal are personnel that are registered with FINRA.

Says Shepherd Smith Edwards and Kantas Founder and Stockbroker Fraud Lawyer William Shepherd, “The financial industry has created its own securities arbitration forum to resolve disputes and claims between and against its members. It is ironic when claims are filed that they often go to court to beg to get out of arbitration, their self-imposed fate. While courts in New York seem to operate to accommodate Wall Street’s wishes, the law for decades has held that decisions regarding the liability of securities firms are for the arbitrators, not the courts. If these investors have properly alleged any wrongdoing by the U.S. securities firm, the court has no business intervening. Such wrongdoing can be simply ‘control person liability,’ which is the failure to control or properly supervise the behavior or operations of a subordinate or subsidiary.”

CGMI placed $343 million of the Abbars money in hedge funds that were included in a leveraged option swap transaction. In their FINRA arbitration claim, the Abbars argue that leading CGMI officers, including ex- global wealth management chief Sallie Krawcheck and Chief Executive Officer Vikram Pandit, pursued them.

Father and son contend that because of alleged “gross misconduct” by CGMI, their wealth was lost. They say that the bank’s failure to monitor the investments properly led to their total collapse during the height of the economic collapse in 2008. The Abbars also believe that lendings related to the Citigroup investments played a role in the losses. The Abbars says that Citigroup, which then started managing the positions that remained in the portfolio while implementing a program to redeem it, will “unjustly benefit” by about $70 million from the redemption of these investments.

Citigroup Sues to Block Arbitration of Saudi Investors’ Claim, Bloomberg/Businessweek, October 6, 2011
Citigroup Aims to Stop Arbitration From Proceeding, OnWallStreet, October 7, 2011

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Citigroup Global Markets Fined $500,000 by FINRA for Inadequate Supervision of Broker Accused of Bilking Sick and Elderly Investors, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, August 16, 2011
Citigroup Ordered by FINRA to Pay $54.1M to Two Investors Over Municipal Bond Fund Losses, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, April 13, 2011
Citigroup to Pay $285M to Settle SEC Lawsuit Alleging SecuritiesFraud in $1B Derivatives Deal, Institutional Investors Securities Blog, October 20, 2011 Continue Reading ›

Two years after San Antonio broker was sentenced to prison for Texas securities fraud, FINRA has fined Merrill Lynch $1M for not properly supervising its former employer. These failures allegedly allowed Bruce Hammonds to run a Ponzi scam that defrauded investors of $1.4M.

Hammonds persuaded 11 people to invest in the Texas Ponzi scam, which he operated under the name B&J Partnership. It was supervisors at Merrill Lynch that gave the green light for him to open an account for B & J. The supervisors also are accused of not monitoring the funds that moved between customers and Hammonds.

Rather than putting investors’ money in a Merrill Lynch fund, he put $1.4 million of their funds in his working capital account. He even gave clients charts showing how the B & J fund was performing even though the fund wasn’t real. Hammonds used the money to pay for his personal spending, including a supposed house-flipping business.

He later pleaded guilty to federal securities charges. In addition to five years behind bars and three year supervised release. Hammond has been barred from the securities industry. All investors have been paid back in full for their losses.

In deciding to fine Merrill Lynch, FINRA found that the financial firm did not have a supervisory system that did a satisfactory enough job of monitoring accounts of employees for signs of possible misconduct. The system was only able to immediately capture accounts opened by an employee if he/she used his/her social security number as the main tax identification number. The SRO also said that between 1/06 and 6/10 Merrill Lynch did not monitor another 40,000 employee/employee-interested accounts.

By agreeing to settle, Merrill is not denying or admitting to the charges.

Failure to Supervise
It is a brokerage firm’s responsibility to establish written procedures for how to properly supervise its employees’ activities. These procedures must then be implemented to prevent broker fraud. When misconduct does arise and failure to supervise played a role in allowing the incident to happen, the financial firm can be held liable for securities fraud.

Brokerage companies have to supervise every broker that they license to work for them. Even if an accused broker is later found not liable, there is still a possibility that the brokerage firm or supervisor can be held liable for failure to supervise and be ordered to pay damages. For example, a broker may not have received the proper training or was given the wrong information by the financial firm, and this resulted in Texas securities fraud that caused an investor to suffer losses.

FINRA Fines Merrill Lynch $1 Million for Supervisory Failures That Allowed a Registered Representative to Operate a Ponzi Scheme, FINRA, October 4, 2011
Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas LTD LLP is Investigating Merrill Lynch in Light of Recent FINRA Fines Against the Firm for Failure to Supervise, MarketWatch, October 5, 2011
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Former Merrill Lynch Employee, Guilty of $1.4 Million Texas Securities Fraud Scheme, Receives Prison Term, Stock Broker Fraud Blog, October 5, 2009
Wedbush Securities Ordered by FINRA to Pay $2.8M in Senior Financial Fraud Case Over Variable Annuities, Stock Broker Fraud Blog, August 31, 2011
Actions of Former Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc. General Counsel Accused of Supervising Rogue Broker to be Reviewed by SEC, Institutional Investors Securities Blog, December 9, 2010 Continue Reading ›

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit says that the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority does not have the authority to take its members to court in order to enforce disciplinary actions. The ruling comes after a years-long legal battle involving penny stock brokerage firm Fiero Brothers and owner John J. Fiero.

Fiero and his financial firm were expelled from FINRA and ordered to pay a $1 million fine for naked short selling and other violations of federal fraud statutes. It was in 1998 that NASD Regulation Inc. filed a complaint accusing Fiero and co-conspirators of engaging in the illegal short-selling of securities to purposely push down the price 10 NASDAQ securities. The financial scam eventually led to the collapse of both Hanover Sterling, which served as the securities’ underwriter and Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp. A NASD hearing panel found that Fiero committed extortion and violated short selling rules. The $1 million fine and expulsion were imposed in 2001.

Fiero Brothers and its owner refused to pay. FINRA took them to court to obtain payment. The SRO first brought its case to New York state court, where the state’s highest court eventually threw out a ruling in FINRA’s favor. Fiero then brought the case to federal court. There, he sought a declaratory judgment that FINRA did not have the power to pursue the fine in court. FINRA then counter-sued.

Now, however, the three-judge panel is saying that FINRA’s housekeeping rule from 1990, which gave it the right to go to court to go after monetary sanctions and the country’s foundational securities laws, does not give the SRO the right to collect disciplinary fines through the court system. The federal appeals court’s ruling overturns a lower court’s decision.

Some are saying that the court’s ruling reduces FINRA’s power and vindicates complaints that have been made accusing the SRO of going beyond its statutory power and abusing the process of rule making. Even ex-FINRA enforcement head Susan Merrill believes that the ruling casts a shadow on FINRA’s housekeeping rules. The court said the 1990 rule needs to be more formally examined because rather than just being a matter of housekeeping, it impacts the rights of members that have been suspended or barred.

Banned brokers are not allowed to reenter the industry unless the pay all fines. As a result, obtaining fines is not usually a problem for FINRA. Now, however, seeing as FINRA doesn’t have the right to enforce payment in court, an action that it has taken over the last two decades, it will be interesting to see how other barred brokers may choose to respond to fine demands.

Meantime, FINRA has said that this latest ruing will not limit its ability to enforce securities laws and FINRA rules, protect investors, or discipline financial firms.

Court: FINRA cannot use lawsuits to collect fines, Reuters, October 5, 2011
Court Says Regulator Exceeded Its Power, New York Times, October 6, 2011
NASD Regulation Bars John Fiero, Expels Fiero Brothers, Inc., and Imposes $1 Million Fine For Illegal Short Sales, Market Manipulation and Extortion, NASD/FINRA, January 8, 2011

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Five Broker-Dealers Fined by FINRA Over Allegedly Misrepresenting Commissions as Fees to Clients, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, September 16, 2011
Texas Securities Fraud: FINRA Fines Bluechip Securities for Ex-Employee’s Alleged Churning of Public Customer Accounts, Stockbroker Fraud Blog, August 28, 2011
Wedbush Ordered By FINRA Panel To Pay $3.5M to Trader Over Withheld Compensation, Institutional Investor Securities Blog, July 16, 2011 Continue Reading ›

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